Abstract. We argue that experimental methodologies are harder to apply when self-motivated agents are involved, especially when the issue of choice gains its due relevance in their model. We use a choice-oriented agent architecture to illustrate a means of bridging the distance between the observer and the actors of an experiment. Traditional experimentation has to give way to exploratory simulation, to bring insights into the design issues, not only of the agents, but of the experiment as well. The role of its designer cannot be ignored, at the risk of achieving only obvious, predictable conclusions. We propose to bring the designer into the experiment. To accomplish that, we provide a value-based model of choice to represent the preferences of both entities. This model includes mechanisms that allow for explicit bonds between observer and observed. We use the findings of extensive experimentation with this model to compare current experimental methodologies in what concerns evaluation itself.
Context
"Artificial intelligence [is] the problem of designing agents that do the right thing." [22, 
page 2, original italics]
A new scientific synthesis has been taking form under the name of artificial intelligence [26] . This young discipline has recently started to rearrange itself under the keynote concept of agent [21] . Agents can be seen as unwanting actors, but gain additional technological interest and use when they have their own motivations, and are left for autonomous labour [7] . Of course, ethical considerations about the role of their designers are required, to constrain the design space of their architectures. But norms may be grounded on reliable experimentation. It is not only a question of metrics (preferences, ranking functions), but the whole methodology is a key issue. In informatics, no-one is completely assured that a program does the "right thing," or all faulty behaviours are absent. In agent technologies, we would like to discover when a creature may turn into a mad (paranoic) one, i. e., know how to switch off inconvenient performance and tune its behaviour in deep detail. If agents are to be used by someone, trust is the key issue. But, how can we trust a agent that pursues its own agenda to accomplish some goals of ours [7] ?
Autonomy deals with the agents' freedom of choice, and choice leads to the agents' behaviour through two specific phases in the decision process. Unlike BDI (beliefs-desires-intentions, cf. [3] ) models, where the stress is given on the technical issues dealing with the agents pro-attitudes (what can be achieved, how can it be done), in the BVG (beliefs-values-goals, cf. [3] ) model, the emphasis is given on choice machinery. Choice is about which goals to pursue (or, where do the goals come from), and how the agent prefers to pursue them (or, which options the agent wants to pick).
In [1, 3, 2] , we have defended a model of choice that depends on the idea of multi-dimensional evaluation of a choice situation to accomplish an enhanced adaptivity to a dynamic and complex environment. These dimensions (which we have called values), are used to select which goals to pursue (through the information of mechanisms for goal adoption), and also which sub-goals are to be preferred and selected for execution.
The central question is evaluation of the quality of decision. If the agent aims at optimising this measure (which can in turn be multi-dimensional), why does s/he not use it for the decision in the first place? And, should this measure be unidimensional, does it amount to a utility function (which would configure the "totilitarian" view: maximising utility as the sole motivation of the agent)?
This view, however discredited since the times of the foundation of artificial intelligence [23] , still prevails in many approaches, even through economics or the social sciences (cf. [6, 13] ).
But in artificial intelligence, the issue of methodology is still in order. Other sciences, even older ones, are still looking for their identity, and to that end, the very concept of computer seems to contribute: it changes the notion of what can be done (calculate), changes the (workable) object of the science, changes the methods. The complexity revolution has only begun, with the gradual and (more and more) systematic use of modern calculation means.
The fact that artificial intelligence depends on this new tool does not ease up this transition. If it possessed from the very beginning the means that are believed to be able to make (generate) the difference, it takes time to find the course, and the methods. The inspiration from social sciences that is on the origin of multi-agent systems is an example of an import. Meanwhile, those same systems are already being exported to other sciences (as economics and sociology), and precisely as methodological aids.
In the next section, we summarise our choice framework, and state the problem of evaluating the results of the agents' decisions. In section 3, we compare two methodologies for conducting experiments for multi-agent systems. We conclude that the issue is not conpletely solved by either one, and note the similarities between evaluation of the results by the designer, and adaptation by the agents. In section 4 we propose two answers for the issue of assessing experimental results. The combination of both approaches, bringing the designer's insights and conjectures into the setting of experiments, fits well into the notion of pursuing exploratory simulation. In the last two sections, we briefly present our experimental results, and finally conclude by exalting the advantages of explicitly connecting the experimenter's and the agents' evaluative dimensions.
Choice and evaluation
The role of value as a new mental attitude towards decision is twofold. On the one hand, values provide a reference framework to represent agent's preference during deliberation (the pondering of options candidate to contribute to a selected goal). On the other, values help inform choice, the final phase of decision, when the agent has to pick an option from the ordered set of options provided by the deliberation phase. To this aim, a probability distribution can be defined by using the relevant values for the situation.
In the BVG choice framework, the agent's system of values evolves as a consequence of the agent's assessment of the results of previous decisions. Decisions are evaluated against certain dimensions (that could be the same previously used for the decision or not), and this assessment is fed back into the agent's mind, by adapting the mechanisms associated with choice, especially the ones related to values. This is another point that escapes the traditional utilitarian view, where the world (and so the agent) is static and known. BVG agents can adapt to an environment where everything changes, including the agent's own preferences (for instance as a result of interactions). This is especially important in a multiagent environment, since the agents are autonomous, and so potentially sources of change and novelty.
The evaluation of the results of our evaluations becomes a central issue, and this question directly points to the difficulties in assessing the results of experiments. We would need meta-values to evaluate those results, but that calls for a designer, and amounts to looking for emergent phenomena. But if those "higher values" exist (and so they are the important ones) why not use them for decision? This dilemma clearly shows the ad hoc character of most solutions, and it is difficult to escape it.
We can conceive two ways out. The first is the development of an ontology of values, to be used in some class of situations as qualitative markers (norms). Higher or lower, values have their place in this ontology, and their relations are clearly defined. For a given problem the relevant values can be identified and used, and appropriate experimental predictions postulated and tested.
When tackling the issue of choice, the formulation of hypotheses and experimental predictions becomes delicate. If the designer tells the agent how to choose, how can he not know exactly how the agent will choose? To formulate experimental predictions and then evaluate to what extent they are fulfilled becomes in this case a spurious game: it amounts to perform calculations about knowledge and reasons, and not to judge to what extent those reasons are the best reasons, and correctly generate the choices. We return to technical reasons for behaviour, in detriment of the will and the preferences of the agent.
Consequently, the second solution is subtler. By situating the agent in an environment with other agents, autonomy becomes a key ingredient, to be used with care and balance. The duality of value sets becomes a necessity, as agents cannot access values at the macro level, made judiciously coincide with the designer values. The answer is the designer, and the problem is methodological. The BVG update mechanism provides a way to put to test this liaison between agent and designer.
The designer's model of choice cannot be the model of perfect choice against which the whole world is to be evaluated. It is our strong conviction that the perfect choice does not exist, because characters perfectly embody a specific set of physical and personality traits. All depends on the adequate fiction (script). It is a model of choice to be compared to another (human) one playing an identical role, by using criteria that in turn may not be perfect.
Experimental methodologies
When Herbert Simon received his Turing award, back in 1973, he felt the need to postulate "artificial intelligence is an empirical science." The duality science/engineering was always a mark of artificial intelligence, so that claim is neither empty nor innocent. Since that time, there has been an ever-increasing effort in artificial intelligence and computer science to experimentally validate the proclaimed results. The interdisciplinary site of artificial intelligence was not always equally prone to imports of scientific methods from other disciplines. So, theoretical demonstration was for decades more used than empirical one. And exemplification (one-shot experiment) more common than demonstration.
[11], followed by [20] , try to define the general lines of an experimental method for artificial intelligence. Controlled experimentation aims at solidifying the scientific discipline, through the variation of the features of a system or its environment, for posterior measure of the effect of those variations in the performance of the system. The worry of [20] is that experimentation led by testbeds and benchmarks provides only a comfortable illusion of scientific progress, but not significant and generalisable results. Comparative measures are valuable for certain ends, but only constitute scientific progress if they suggest or provide evidence for theories that can explain the differences in performance.
Steve Hanks and Martha Pollack debated over the question of realism and result generalisation. Any experimentable phenomenon has as basis a model of the real one. But simplifications necessary to the modelling process can be so strong that the resulting model is very far from the original model. Such an irrealistic model, despite allowing for controlled experimentation, is almost useless, since it will hardly allow the generalisation of the results to real world systems embedded in complex environments.
To achieve this balance between simplicity and realism, Hanks proposed to focus on more realistic systems and environments, and to conduct experiments directly over them. The danger of experimentation on overly simplistic models is to turn attention to the experimental process itself, instead of the ideas that are supposed to be tested. That is, the danger is the seduction of solving problems one can understand, instead of problems that are interesting.
From another standpoint, Pollack suggested it is enough to keep systematicity in experiments, and look for inspiration on how to generalise results in other sciences, with a greater experimentation tradition. And she argued that experiments, even if simple (and simplicity permits experimental control), can suggest additional ones, that is, experimentation is an iterative process, and a part of the experimental process is precisely to refine the mapping between a theory and its realisation in implemented systems.
A system, however big and realistic, is always a model, and so there will always be a distance separating it from reality. The third author, Paul Cohen, ended up giving the methodological answer to the problem of generalising the results of experiments. Acknowledging that empirical results are seldom general, Cohen insisted that nothing prevents the researcher from "inventing general theories as interpretations of results of studies in simulation testbeds, and nothing prevents [him] (...) from designing additional studies to test predictions of these theories in several simulation testbeds" [20, page 39].
A methodology for principled experimentation
Simulation testbeds (and so controlled small scale experimentation) have a relevant role in three phases of research. In an exploratory phase, to provide the environment where the agents will be inserted; in a confirmation phase, by more strictly defining the characterisations of behaviours, and testing specific hypotheses; in a generalisation phase, by trying to replicate the results.
MAD (Modelling, Analysis and Design) involves seven activities [11] : (1) evaluate the environmental factors that affect behaviour; (2) model the causal relations between system design, its environment, and its behaviour; (3) design or redesign a system (or part of one); (4) predict how the system will behave; (5) run experiments to test predictions; (6) explain unexpected results and modify the models and design of the system; and (7) generalise models to classes of systems, environments and behaviours.
In [12] , Cohen sustains that the goals of the study can be exploratory, test scientific hypotheses, provide calibration data, adequate model parameters, etc. Demonstrations (traditional in artificial intelligence) show only how something can be made to work, are not necessarily exploratory, or test hypotheses, or estimate parameters. The exploratory dimension follows Cohen idea, of defining designs around ideas, instead of valuing premature experimentation.
Cohen states the fundamental question to link this methodology to the concept of experiment with self-motivated agents we envisage. The third criterion to evaluate the design of experiments is: "What are the criteria of good performance? Who defines these criteria?"
The answer to these questions is an invitation to consider rationality itself, and its criteria. The fact that rationality is situated (in some sort of fiction) most times imposes the adoption of ad hoc decision criteria. But the evaluation of the results of experiments is not intrinsically different from the evaluation the agents conduct of their own performance (and upon which they base their adaptation). In particular, there was always a designer defining both types of evaluation. So the question comes natural: why would the design of some component be "better" than the other (and support one "right thing")? Most times there is no reason at all, and the designer uses the same criteria (the same "rationality") either for the agent's adaptation or for the evaluation of its performance. For if a better way of choosing, both components are redesigned, but always together. The alternative to this scenario amounts to look for and study emergent properties of the systems, and we will tackle it in the following sections. As to MAD methodology, it was critically reviewed in [10] and the application of the resulting methodology (extended MAD) will be reassessed in section 5.
A methodology from the social sciences
The problem we have just posed about the duality experiment evaluation versus evaluation by the agents themselves, is not different from the above mentioned problem of the generalisation of the results of experiments: to what extent isn't our evaluation of experiments more centred in the design of the agents that participate in it?
When both these questions seem alike, and the experiments criteria seem to be themselves object of the experiment, perhaps we have reached the limits of simplification, and reductionist techniques. An alternative is to revert positions: exchange reductionist analyses for holistic ones (integrating syntheses), and simplification for complexity [26] .
In multi-agent systems, the greatest development of this tendency happened in the interaction with the social sciences, and had the greatest reach with the opposition of simulation to controlled experimentation. Multi-agent systems get their inspiration in eminently social phenomena. The first metaphor to try out is the social one, motivated by the way (mainly) human agents organise themselves. But artificial intelligence brings the advantage of computational models, hence easily manipulable. So the second metaphor bases itself on the first one, but introduces variation.
Quickly, social scientists understood the potential of the return of this inspiration export. The notion of agent and computational simulation are the master beams of the new complexity science [14] .
Computational simulation is methodologically appropriate when a social phenomenon is not directly accessible [18] . One of the reasons for this lack of accessibility is complexity being so big that the researcher cannot grasp the relevant elements of the target phenomenon. Simulation is based in a more observable phenomenon than the target one. Often the study of the model is as interesting as the study of the phenomenon itself, the model becomes a legitimate object of research [13] . There is a shift from the focus of research of natural societies (the behaviour of a society model can be observed "in vitro" to test the underlying theory) to the artificial societies themselves (study of possible societies). The questions to be answered cease to be "what happened?" and "what may have happened?" and become "what are the necessary conditions for a given result to be obtained?," and cease to have a purely descriptive character to acquire a prescriptive one. A new methodology can be synthesised, and designated "exploratory simulation" [13] . The prescriptive character (exploration) cannot be simplistically resumed to a optimisation, such as the descriptive character is not a simple reproduction of the real social phenomena.
In social sciences, an appropriate methodology for computational simulation could be the one outlined by Nigel Gilbert [17] : (1) identify a "puzzle," a question whose answer is unknown; (2) definition of the target of modelling; (3) normally, some observations of the target are necessary, to provide the parameters and initial conditions of the model; (4) after developing the model (probably in the form of a computer program), the simulation is executed, and its results are registered; (5) verification assures the model is correctly developed; (6) validation ensures that the behaviour of the model corresponds to the behaviour of the target; and (7) finally, the sensitivity analysis tells how sensitive the model is to small changes in the parameters and initial conditions.
We are not far from MAD methodology, but there are fundamental differences: in MAD there is no return to the original phenomenon. The emphasis is still on the system, and the confrontation of the model with reality is done once and for all, and represented by causal relations. All the validation is done at the level of the model, and the journey back to reality is done already in generalisation. In some way, that difference is acceptable, since the object of the disciplines is also different. But it is Cohen himself who asks for more realism in experimentation, and his methodology fails in that involvement with reality.
But, is it possible to do better? Is the validation step in Gilbert's methodology a realist one? Or can we only compare models with other models and never with reality? If our computational model produces results that are adequate to what is known about the real phenomenon, can we say that our model is validated, or does that depend on the source of knowledge about that phenomenon? Isn't that knowledge obtained also from models? For instance, from results of questionnaires filled by a representative sample of the population -where is the real phenomenon here? Which of the models is then the correct one?
The answer could be in [24] : social sciences have an exploratory purpose, but also a predictive and even prescriptive one. Before we conduct simulations that allow predictions and prescriptions, it is necessary to understand the phenomena, and for that one uses exploratory simulation, the exploration of simulated (small) worlds. But when we do prediction, the real world gives the answer about the validity of the model.
Once collected the results of simulations, they have to be confronted with the phenomenon, for validation. But this confrontation is no more than analysis. With the model of the phenomenon to address and the model of the data to collect, we have again a simplification of the problem, and the question of interpretation returns, which we have already found in localised experimentation. It certainly isn't possible to suppress the role of the researcher, ultimate interpreter of all experiments, be it classical or simulation. The bottom-up approach which forms the basis of computational simulation forces us to consider the concept of emergence.
When conducting experiments and simulations, it is a constant worry of the designer to verify if the so-called emergent behaviours wouldn't be preprogrammed, in the sense of being an inevitable consequence of the way the agents were built. Gilbert [16] provides a criterion to distinguish emergent behaviour (in Gestalt sense, according to Castelfranchi's account [8] ) from behaviour predictable from the individual characteristics of the agents: it should not be possible to analytically derive the global emergent behaviour solely from the consideration of the agents' properties. That is, the analysis has to fail, and the simulation be inevitable to discover those properties. But emergence may not even be a stable or interesting property of systems: what is interesting are the system macro-properties and their relations with its micro-properties [16] .
We can redraw the problem we have described above (evaluation of the results by the designer versus adaptation by the agents) in the more restrained panorama of Castelfranchi's different emergencies. The observer of the agent's performance becomes the agent itself, and representational-emergence is confused with Gestalt-emergence.
We will introduce this exact relation between the designer of the experiment and its participant (agent). The information the agent uses to update its choice machinery may or not be related to the information the designer is interested in observing. And the performance measures of agents and societies may or not, correspondingly, be related to the evaluation measures of experiments. But remember the discussion in the beginning of this paper, neither ones are the perfect measures.
Two answers
In this section we will present two different answers for the problem of analysing (and afterwards, generalising) the results of the experimentation, which we have already argued to have quite a strong connection to the problem of improving the agents performance as a result of evaluation of the previous choices.
The explicit consideration of the relevant evaluative dimensions in decision situations can arguably provide a bridge between the agent's and the experiments designer's mind. In a model such as BVG [3] , the agent's choice mechanisms are fed back with a set of multi-dimensional update values. These dimensions may or not be the same that were used to make the decision in the first place. If these dimensions should be different, we can identify the ones that were used for decision with the interests of the agent, and the ones used for update with the interests of the designer. And moreover, we have an explicit link between the two sets of interests. So, the designer is no longer left for purely subjective guessing of what might be happening, confronted with the infinite regress of ever more challenging choices. S/he can explore the liaisons provided by this choice framework, and experiment with different sets of preferences (desired results), both of hers and of the agents.
However, the problem remains of finally having to have a say about what really happened. In fact, both authors have slightly different positions about this, and in the remainder of this section we will diverge to elaborate on those positions. Or, you can look at these following two subsections as different scientific (or better, scientifically philosophic) hypotheses about evaluation of evaluations.
Positivism: means-ends analysis in a layered mind
We can postulate a positivist (optimistic) position by basing our ultimate evaluations on a pre-conceived ontology of such deemed relevant dimensions (or values). Having those as a top-level reference, the designer's efforts can concentrate on the appropriate models, techniques and mechanisms to achieve the best possible performance as measured along those dimensions.
It seems that all that remains is then optimisation along the desired dimensions, but even in that restrained view we have to acknowledge that it does not mean that all problems are now solved. Chess is a domain where information is perfect and the number of possibilities is limited, and even so it was not (will it ever be?) solved.
Alternatively, the designer can be interested in evaluating how the agents perform in the absence of the knowledge of what dimensions are to be optimised. In this case, several models can be used, and the links to the designer's mind can still be expressed in the terms described above.
The key idea is to approximate the states that the agent wishes to achieve to those that it believes are currently valid. This amounts to performing a complex form of means-ends analysis, in which the agent's sociality is an issue, but necessarily one in which the agent does not have any perception about the meta-values involved. Because that would reinstate the infinite regression problem.
The external evaluation problem can be represented in terms as complex as the experiment designer thinks appropriate. Suppose the scenario of a supermarket where types of behaviours are expected. How can we force our agent to acquire those behaviours? First, tuning the agent to move from some initial (IB) to a final behaviour (FB), due to reflexive markers (a sort of norms). The tuning is controlled by an operator able to reduce the difference between IB and FB. In a BDI-like logical approach, evaluation can be as simple as answering the question "were the desired states achieved or not?," or as complicated as the designer desires and the decision framework allows to represent.
The choice mechanisms update becomes an important issue, for they are trusted to generate the desired approximation between the agent's performance (in whichever terms) and the desired one.
Interesting new architectural features recently introduced by Castelfranchi [8] can come to the aid of the task of unveiling these ultimate aims that justify behaviour. Castelfranchi acknowledges a problem for the theory of cognitive agents: "how to reconcile the 'external' teleology of behaviour with the 'internal' teleology governing it; how to reconcile intentionality, deliberation, and planning with playing social functions and contributing to the social order." [8, page 6, original italics].
He then notes that "self-organising social processes -not being chosen -are indifferent, in principle, to the agents' or groups' goals and welfare; they are not necessarily (...) advantageous for something and somebody. Since the effects reproducing the behaviour are not realised and appreciated by the subject, there is no reason for assuming that they will necessarily be 'good' for his/her needs or aims, or good for society's aims." [8, page 35] .
Following van Parijs [25] , Castelfranchi defends reinforcement as a kind of internal natural selection, the selection of an item (e.g. a habit) directly within the entity, through the operation of some internal choice criterion.
And so, to meet our own idea of means-ends analysis, Castelfranchi proposes the notion of learning, in particular, reinforcement learning in cognitive, deliberative agents. This could be realised in a hybrid layered architecture, but not one where reactive behaviours compete against a declarative component. The idea is to have "a number of low-level (automatic, reactive, merely associative) mechanisms operate upon the layer of high cognitive representations" [8, page 22, original italics].
Damasio's [15] somatic markers, and consequent mental reactions of attraction or repulsion, serve to constrain high level explicit mental representations, as our reflexive markers do. This mental architecture can do without the necessity of an infinite recursion of meta-levels, goals and meta-goals, decisions about preferences and decisions. In this meta-level layer there could be no explicit goals, but only simple procedures, functionally teleological automatisms.
In the context of our ontology of values, the notion of attraction/repulse could correspond to the top level of the hierarchy, that is, the ultimate value to satisfy. Optimisation of some function, manipulation and elaboration of symbolic representations (such as goals), pre-programmed (functional) reactivity to stimuli, are three faces of the same notion of ending up the regress of motivations (and so of evaluations over experiments). This regress of abstract motivations can only be stopped by grounding the ultimate reason for choice in concrete concepts, coming from embodied minds.
Relativism: extended MAD, exploratory simulation
As we explained, there are some problems in the application of MAD methodology to decision situations. MAD is heavily based on hypotheses formulation and predictions about systems behaviour, and posterior confrontation with experimental observations. We have already suggested that an alternative could be conjectures-led exploratory simulation.
The issues raised by the application of MAD deal with meta-evaluation of behaviours (and so, of underlying models). We have proposed an extension to MAD that concerns correction between the diverse levels of specification (from informal descriptions to implemented systems, passing by intermediate levels of more or less formal specification) [10] . This extension is based on the realisation of the double role of the observer of a situation (which we could translate here into the role of the agent and that of the designer).
The central point is to evaluate the results of agent's decisions. Since the agent is autonomous and has its own reasons for behaviour, how can the designer dispute its choices? A possible answer is that the designer is not interested in allowing the agent to use the best set of reasons. In this case what is being tested is not the agent, but what the designer thinks are the best reasons. The choice model to be tested is not the one of the agent, and the consequences may be dramatic in open societies.
In BVG, the feedback of such evaluative information can be explicitly used to alter the agents choice model, but also to model the mind of the designer. So, agents and designer can share the same terms in which the preferences can be expressed, and this eases up validation. The model of choice is not the perfect reference against which the world must be evaluated (we have already sustained that such a model does not exist), but just a model to be compared to another one, by using criteria that again might not be perfect.
This seems to amount to an infinite regress. If we provide a choice model of some designer, it is surely possible to replicate it in the choice model of an agent, given enough liberty degrees to allow the update mechanisms to act. But what does that tell us? Nothing we couldn't predict from the first instant, since it would suffice that the designer's model would be used in the agent. In truth, to establish a realist experiment, the designer's choice model would itself be subject to continuous evolution to represent his/her choices (since it is immersed in a complex dynamical world). And the agent's model, with its update mechanisms, would be "following" the other, as well as it could. But then,what about the designer's model, what does it evolve to follow? Which other choice model can this model be emulating, and how can it be represented?
Evaluation is harder for choice, for a number of reasons: choice is always situated and individual, and it is not prone to generalisations; it is not possible to establish criteria to compare choices that do not challenge the choice criteria themselves; the adaptation of the choice mechanisms to an evaluation criteria appears not as a test to its adaptation capabilities, but rather as a direct confrontation of the choices.
Who should tell if our choices are good or not, based on which criteria can s/he do it, why would we accept those criteria, and if we accept them and start making choices by them, how can we evaluate them afterwards? By transposing this argument to experimental methodology, we see the difficulty in its application, for the decisive step is compromised by this opposition between triviality (when we use the same criteria to choose and to evaluate choices) and infinite and inevitable regression (that we have just described).
Despite all this, the agent cannot be impotent, prevented from improving its choices. Certainly, human agents are not, since they keep choosing better (but not every time), learn from their mistakes, have better and better performances, not only in terms of some external opinion, but also according to their own. Not always the change in choices results from a tentative at improving, the agent may have only changed opinion. If one considers that the choice made by the agent is the best choice s/he could have done (in some sense, the perfect choice whose existence we refuse), changing opinion is the only way to improve.
As a step forward, and out of this uncomfortable situation, we can also consider that the agent has two different rationalities, one for choice, another for its evaluation and subsequent improvement. One possible reason for such a design could be the complexity of the improvement function be so demanding that its use for common choices would not be justified.
To inform this choice evaluation function, we can envisage three candidates: (i) a higher value, or some specialist's opinion, be it (ii) some individual, or (iii) some aggregate, representing a prototype or group.
The first, we have already described in detail in the previous subsection: some higher value, at a top position in a ontological hierarchy of value. In a context of social games of life and death, survival could be a good candidate for such a value. As would some more abstract dimension of goodness or righteousness of a decision. That is, the unjustifiable (or irreducible) sensation that, all added up, the right (good, just) option is evident to the decider, even if all calculations show otherwise. This position is close to that of moral imperative, or duty. But this debate over whether all decisions must come from the agents pursuing their own interest has to be left for further studies.
The second follows Simon's idea for the evaluation of choice models: choices are compared to those made by a human specialist. While we want to verify if choices are the same or not, this idea seems easy to implement. But if we want to argue that the artificial model chooses better than the reference human, we return to the problem of deciding what 'better' means.
The third candidate is some measure obtained from an aggregation of agents which are similar to the agent or behaviour we want to study. We so want to compare choices made by an agent based on some model, with choices made by some group to be studied (empirically, in principle). In this way we test realistic applications of the model, but assuming the principle that the decider agent represents in some way the group to be studied. A recent methodological approach can help us out here [19] . The phases of construction of theories are depicted in figure 1 . However, we envisage several problems in the application of this methodology. Up front, the obvious difficulties in the translation from (T) to (E) and from (T) to (A), the subjectivity in the selection of the set of results (R) and corresponding observations (O), the formulation of hypotheses (H) from (E) (as Einstein said: "no path leads from the experience to the theory"). The site of the experimenter becomes again central, which only reinforces the need of defining common ground between him/her and the mental content of the agents in the simulation. Thereafter, the picture (as its congeners in [19] ) gives further emphasis to the traditional forms of experimentation. But Hales himself admits experimentation in artificial societies demands for new methods, different from traditional induction and deduction. Like Axelrod says: "Simulation is a third form of making science. (...) While induction can be used to discover patterns in data, and deduction can be used to find consequences of assumptions, the modelling of simulations can be used as an aid to intuition." [5, page 24] This is the line of reasoning already defended in [13] : to observe theoretical models running in an experimentation test bed, it is 'exploratory simulation. ' The difficulties in concretising the verification process (=) in figure 1 are even more stressed in [9] : the goal of these simulation models is not to make predictions, but to obtain more knowledge and insight. This amounts to radically changing the drawing of figure 1. The theory is not necessarily the starting point, and the construction of explanations can be made autonomously, as well as the formulation of hypotheses. Both can even result from the application of the model, instead of being used for its evaluation. According to Casti [9] , model validation is done qualitatively, recurring to intuitions of human specialists. These can seldom predict what occurs in simulations, but they are experts at explaining the occurrences. Figure 2 is inspired in the scheme of explanation discovery of [19] , and results from the synthesis of the scheme for construction of theories of figure 1, and a model of simulations validation. The whole picture should be read at the light of [9] , that is, the role of the experimenter and his/her intuition is ineluctable. Issues of translation, retroversion and their validation are important, and involve the experimenter [10] . On the other hand, Hales' (=) is substituted by an evaluation machinery (V), that can be designed around values. Here, the link between agents and experimenter can be enhanced by BVG choice framework.
Combining the two approaches
One of the key points of the difference between figures 1 and 2 is the fact that theories, explanations and hypotheses are being constructed, and not only given and tested. Simulation is precisely the search for theories and hypotheses. These come from conjectures, through metaphors, intuitions, etc. Even evaluation needs intuitions from the designer to lead to new hypotheses and explanations. This process allows the agent's choices to approximate the model that is provided as reference. Perhaps this model is not as accurate as it should be, but it can always be replaced by another, and the whole process of simulation can provide insights into what this other model should be. In BVG (see figure 3) , choice is based on the agent's values (say, machinery W ), and performed by a function F (a set of control buttons, distributed by the F components). F returns a real value that momentarily serialises the alternatives at the time of decision. The agent's system of values is updated by a function U that uses multidimensional assessments of the results of previous decisions. We can represent the designer's choice model by taking these latter dimensions as a new set of values, W (or, we can tune the function F manually, by moving those control buttons). Mechanisms F and U provide explicit means for drawing the link between the agent's (choosing) mind and the designer's experimental questions, thus transporting the designer into the (terms of the) experiment. This is accomplished by relating the backwards arrows in both figures (2 and 3) . We superimpose the scheme of the agent on the scheme of the experiment.
Assessment of experimental results
This concern with experimental validation was an important keynote in the development of the BVG architecture. Initially we reproduced (using Swarm) the results of Axelrod's [4] "model of tributes," because of the simplicity of the underlying decision model. Through principled exploration of the decision issues, we uncovered certain features of the model previously unidentified by Axelrod. But the rather rigid character of the decision setting would not allow the model to show its full worth.
In our most elaborated experiment (in a Prolog test bed), agents select wines from a pool of options, in order to satisfy some (value-characterised) goals [3, 2] . This introduced new issues in the architecture, such as non-transitivity in choice, the adoption of goals and of values, non-linear adaptation, the confront between adaptation based on one or multiple evaluations of the consequences of decisions. We provide some hints into the most interesting results we have found.
In a series of runs, we included in F a component that subverts transitivity in the choice function: the same wine can rise different expectations (and decisions) in different agents. A new value was incorporated, to account for the effect of surprise that a slightly high price can raise, causing different evaluations (of attraction and of repulse).
The perils of subverting transitivity are serious. It amounts to withdrawing the golden rule of classical utility, that "all else being equal" we will prefer the cheaper option. However, we sustain that it is not necessarily irrational (sometimes) not to do so. We have all done that in some circumstances. The results of the simulations concerning this effect of surprise were very encouraging. Moreover, the agent's choices remained stable with this interference. The agent does not loose sense of what its preferences are, and what its rationality determines. It acts as if it allowed itself a break, in personal indulgence.
In other runs, we explored the role of values in regulating agent interactions, for instance, goal adoption. We found that when we increase the heterogeneity of the population in terms of values (of opposite sign, say), we note changes in the choices made, but neither radical, neither significant, and this is a surprising and interesting fact. The explanation is the "normalising" force of the multiple values and their diffusion. An agent with one or another different value still remains in the same world, sharing the same information, exchanging goals with the same agents. The social ends up imposing itself.
What is even more surprising is that this force is not so overwhelming that all agents would have exactly the same preferences. So many things are alike in the several agents, that only the richness of the model of decision, allied to their particular life stories, avoids that phenomenon.
The model of decision based on multiple values, with complex update rules, and rules for information exchange and goal adoption, presents a good support for decision making in a complex and dynamic world. It allows for a rich range of behaviours that escapes from directed and excessive optimisation (in terms of utilitarian rationality, it allows for "bad" decisions), but does not degenerate in pure randomness, or nonsense (irrationality). It also permits diversity of attitudes in the several agents, and adaptation of choices to a dynamic reality, and with (un)known information.
Whichever the experiment design, whoever conducts it, we don't think results can ever be considered absolutely valid. Never, in science. Just like a democratic election will never discover the best option, only the preferred one. The best choice does not exist, nor does the best criterion to decide it. What are the obtained results worth, then? Still, and despite all, the best possible, in each moment.
This is the essence of the calculus of importance (and democracy) behind the use of values. Even knowing importance is relevant, we have to accept that a calculus is possible and helps us, although in a field of uncertainty. So, every measure, every evaluation in complex phenomena is escorted by uncertainty rates. And still, we are here alive! Accordingly, no prescribed methodology will ever be perfect for all situations. Our aim here is to draw attention to the role of the designer in any experiment, and also to the usually underaddressed issue of choice in the agent's architecture. Having a value-based choice model at our hands as a means to consider selfmotivated autonomous agents, these two ideas add up to provide a complete decision framework, where the designer is brought into the experiment, through the use of common terms with the deciding agents.
